broadened the distances at which they are willing to extend some kinds of commercial loans. Indeed, for some large institutions and for some types of commercial credit, loans previously restricted by geography now appear to be offered virtually nationwide.
If these findings portend a greater willingness of lenders to extend credit to faraway borrowers, one might argue that this enhances the availability of competitively priced credit by providing borrowers access to a wider array of prospective lenders. Since borrowers will be less dependent upon local lenders, the implication is that the size of geographic markets used in antitrust analysis should be revised upward over time. However, while increases in average distances between lenders and their borrowers may have implications for antitrust policy, the conclusions to be drawn will be substantively different if those increases reflect the behavior of a limited subset of lenders and apply only to certain types of loans.
A considerable body of research provides ample reason to believe that important differences in the distances between borrower and lender may exist as a result of inherent differences in the characteristics of the loan products and in the screening technology employed. As discussed in more detail below, several contributions have argued that large banks tend to engage in "transaction-driven" lending that relies heavily on "hard" information, such as that obtainable from balance sheets and other directly observable sources, while smaller banks tend to engage in "relationshipdriven" lending that tends to rely disproportionately on close monitoring and less tangible sources of information.
One cannot assume that transaction-driven loans are invariably made at longer distances, while relationship-driven loans are invariably made at shorter distances. It does seem likely, however, that the former type of lending involves, on average, longer distances than the latter and that the adoption of innovations, such as credit scoring, by larger institutions may have resulted in an increase in the distances for the "transaction-driven" loans of large banks but not for the "relationship-driven" loans of smaller banks. In fact, theories (to be cited below) have been advanced that may be interpreted to suggest that, for the relationship-driven loans of smaller lenders, distance may not be losing its grip as a deterrent to lending. Indeed, it may even be becoming, on average, more important, implying, all else equal, an actual reduction in the distance between borrower and lender for this type of lending.
Because of these potential differences in the role of distance and because (as documented below) the vast bulk of the dollar volume of commercial lending still appears to be quite local in nature, this paper employs a new source of data to examine the relationship between lending decisions and distance at the shorter end of the distance spectrum. The analysis makes use of detailed information, collected annually as a result of changes in the regulations implementing the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), on the location of borrowers. For some reported estimations, a procedure is employed that accounts for spatially correlated errors across census tracts. We report three basic findings: (1) distance operates as a deterrent to lending, even within areas traditionally defined as local markets, (2) distance is more of a deterrent for small banks than for larger organizations, even within these areas, and (3) for those commercial loans made within areas currently treated by regulators as markets, distance has not been declining in importance. Indeed, a preponderance of the evidence suggests that it is becoming, if anything, more of a factor.
The first two findings are clearly relevant to antitrust policy as applied to the banking industry, since, as currently practiced, it completely ignores the role of distance in the case of proposed mergers between institutions operating in the same defined market. The final finding is of more interest in assessing the future state of lending competition. Our favored interpretation of it is that the significant innovations in bank lending introduced thus far, while undoubtedly welfare enhancing, have "peeled off" only some, and probably the more distant, loans made previously by local lenders, leaving a hard core of local loans not easily amenable to these new technologies. Theories by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (forthcoming) and Hauswald and Marquez (2002) suggest that greater competition by distant lenders, spurred by new innovations, may cause local lenders to focus on the loans for which they have an informational advantage, and this may involve shorter, rather than longer, distance between these lenders and their borrowers. This means that the new innovations seen thus far will only go so far in eliminating the local nature of commercial lending. Its complete elimination will probably require some additional significant innovations.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 summarizes the theoretical reasons why distance may be important in lending and reviews the empirical evidence, focusing on those studies that have specifically addressed how the relationship between distance and lending may be changing over time. Section 2 describes the estimation procedure employed. Section 3 discusses the data used and Section 4 describes the results obtained. A final section summarizes the analysis and presents conclusions.
LITERATURE
It is well established that some large banking organizations have begun in recent years to extend some types of commercial credit to borrowers located at substantial distances from them. These have tended to be credit card loans and, perhaps more interestingly, loans facilitated by innovations such as credit scoring.
1 But there is also reason to believe that the preponderance of commercial lending has not experienced major changes in distances between borrower and lender. The most direct evidence of this may be found in the work of Wolken and Rohde (2002) , who compare results of the 1993 and 1998 Surveys of Small Business Finance (SSBF). They find that for small business loans in general, the average distance between the business's headquarters and the financial institution making the loan increased from 115 miles in 1993 to 244 miles in 1998, while the median distance increased only one mile, from 9 miles to 10 miles, during the same period. It is clear that this sharp distinction between the mean and median changes is driven by a sharp increase in distance exhibited at the upper tail of the distance distribution.
2 Peterson and Rajan (2002) conclude that the distance between small firms and their lenders is increasing over time and that this phenomenon is correlated with improvements in bank productivity. Their findings were based on a "synthetic panel" that the authors constructed from the 1993 SSBF cross section, wherein the distance between borrower and lender was compared with the time at which respondents in the 1993 SSBF report the lending relationship began. While their study did report mean and median changes in distances, it did not focus on the possibility of systematic differences between the high and low ends of the distance distribution.
Another study that addressed the relationship between distance and lending over time was conducted by Degryse and Ongena (2002) . In a paper that examines how the distance between a borrower and a lender affects the interest rate paid on loans from a large Belgian bank, the authors address the issue of whether the distances between borrowers and the bank have been changing over time. They conclude that the distance between the bank in their study and the European firms it served did not increase substantially between 1975 and 1997.
The theoretical literature has put forth two different rationales for why distance should serve as a deterrent to lending. The first, drawn from traditional models of spatial competition, is borrower travel cost. Prospective borrowers must incur travel costs to do business with a lender, in much the same way that is more commonly asserted for a depositor that chooses to do business with one depository institution rather than another. Papers by Barros (1999) , Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo, and Verdier (1995) , and Park and Pennacchi (2005) present analyses based on this notion.
The second rationale, more specific to the case of commercial credit, concerns the advantage that proximity may give lenders in screening prospective borrowers and monitoring loans, particularly in the case of loans to small businesses. Lenders lacking the "hard" information provided by detailed public financial statements typically available for large firms have to rely on "soft" information informally collected through relationships between the lender and the borrower. The collection of this soft information is costly to the lender, as it may require multiple site visits by a loan officer to the small business or specialized knowledge of the local market in which the firm operates. Additionally, banks may acquire information on small firms through the provision of non-loan-related banking services, such as checking accounts that are most often provided by local suppliers. In these instances, a firm would be more likely to receive favorable loan terms from lenders in closer proximity to the firm, as close lenders would incur lower costs to gather soft information. Almazan (2002) provides an example of this type of model.
2. Using the 1993 SSBF, Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and Wolken (1997) also note that the vast majority of firms borrow from lenders that are quite close to them geographically. Using more recent data from the Credit, Banks and Small Business Survey, conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business, Scott (2003) finds that in 2001, the average distance (measured in travel time) between a small business and its primary financial institution was 9.5 minutes, with a median of 5 minutes.
Particularly relevant to this rationale for the importance of distance are the differences in the types of lending done by commercial banks of different sizes, and how innovations in the lending process have influenced distances at which it is profitable to conduct such lending. The model by Stein (2002) implies that smaller firms have an advantage when information about projects is "soft" and cannot be credibly transmitted, while large hierarchies perform better when information can be costlessly "hardened" and passed along inside the firm. Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004) , Scott (2004) , and Berger et al. (forthcoming) all report findings consistent with the notion that small banks lend disproportionately to informationally "opaque" firms for which soft information must be evaluated, while large banks tend to lend disproportionately to firms for which data obtained from financial statements and other sources of hard information are evaluated.
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Another important area of research relevant to the question at hand concerns the innovations that have occurred in recent years and that might account for a substantial increase in distances between borrower and lender at the higher end of the distance distribution. Studies by Akhavein, Frame, and White (2005) , Berger, Frame, and Miller (forthcoming) , Frame, Padhi, and Woosley (2004) , and Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley (2001) collectively provide strong evidence that credit scoring has been adopted primarily by larger banking organizations. By lowering information costs between borrowers and lenders, this has led to increased "out-of-market" lending by banking organizations. As Berger and Udell (2002) note, there are in fact several different alternative lending technologies that can be used to lend to small businesses. These include financial statement lending, asset-based finance (which can be further divided into asset-based lending and factoring), credit scoring, and relationship lending. Innovations in any of these technologies could affect future trends in observed relationships involving distance. For now, however, only the innovation of credit scoring has been extensively studied, and it may well be the only innovation to have substantially changed distance relationships thus far. 4 Of considerable relevance to the issues relating to how changes in the competitive environment might alter the relationship between distance and lending are the theoretical models of Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (forthcoming) and Hauswald and Marquez (2002) . If innovations arise that disproportionately reduce the cost of commercial lending by large banks, this may allow these banks to extend loans to more distant markets, even though they might be at an informational disadvantage relative to closer, local financial institutions. Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (forthcoming) provide a model of this type of situation and examine how the extension of credit in local markets might be affected by changes in either the cost advantages of the lessinformed banks or in the degree of informational asymmetry among financial institutions. The authors show that greater competition from outside lenders will cause local banks to reallocate credit toward borrowers for whom the local lenders possess an informational advantage (an effect that Dell'Ariccia and Marquez term a "flight to captivity"). If proximity confers an informational advantage, this suggests that greater competition from outside lenders might result in local lenders reducing the distance over which they extend credit to businesses.
In a related paper, Hauswald and Marquez (2002) present a model that focuses on "informational distance" and its relationship to investments in information acquisition technology by lenders. An implication of their model is that, as competition increases, banks may respond by shifting their resources to loans involving greater informational proximity. If informational proximity translates to physical proximity, then a reduction in the distance between borrower and lender as competition increases is a possible outcome.
Together, the papers by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (forthcoming) and Hauswald and Marquez (2002) suggest that the competitive changes brought about by technological changes in bank lending may have asymmetric effects on the relationship between distance and lending. In particular, while technological changes may lead some financial institutions to lend beyond their local markets, the resulting changes in the competitive environment might lead local lenders to restrict their lending activities to a smaller geographic area.
While it is possible that the innovations that have resulted in the rise of longerdistance "intermarket" loans may be at work to increase distances associated with shorter-distance, "intramarket" loans, this need not be the case. Indeed, the results of the existing empirical literature are consistent with the predictions of Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (forthcoming) and Hauswald and Marquez (2002) relating to the asymmetric effects on the relationship between distance and lending.
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
As discussed in more detail below, the empirical analysis makes use of detailed information on the distance between the census tract of the borrower and the nearest office of the lender. Because we believe the data are more reliable in indicating that at least one loan is made to a census tract than it is in indicating the number of loans made to a census tract, we employ a probit model to generate results reported below. However, the use of the number of loans, rather than the fact of at least one loan, to a census tract is found to yield similar results. Results obtained using the number of loans are discussed below and presented in the Appendix.
Results reported in the text are obtained using a probit model that allows for spatially dependent errors and corrects for heteroscedasticity. In this model, the probability that a bank extends credit to a census tract is assumed to be a function of the attractiveness of conditions in that census tract. Attractiveness can be affected by the demand characteristics of potential borrowers in that census tract, the ability of banks to reach potential borrowers in that census tract, the degree of adverse selection that the bank faces, or other considerations. A bank, b, makes a loan to census tract c in year t if the latent variable L bct , which represents the attractiveness of the lending environment of the census tract to bank b, is greater than zero. This latent variable is assumed to follow a linear functional form given by
where u bct is a random normal disturbance term, β is a k × 1 vector of coefficients, and X bct is a 1 × k vector of explanatory variables reflecting the characteristics of the bank making the loan, the characteristics of the census tract into which the loan is made, and interactions between the bank and census tract (such as the distance between the bank and the census tract). The random disturbance terms are assumed to have a spatial autoregressive structure, so that u bct ϭ ρ ͚ j w cj u bjt ϩ ε bct , where ρ is a parameter indicating the strength of the spatially autoregressive process, w cj is a measure of spatial contiguity, and ε bct is an i.i.d. draw from a standard normal distribution. The parameter ρ therefore reflects the influence of unobserved characteristics of neighboring census tracts that are correlated across space, rather than the impact of observations across time.
Written in matrix notation, the model specification can be expressed as
and
W is the spatial weight matrix that describes the spatial pattern of the autoregressive process. In this application w cj is equal to the proportion of census tract c's border that is shared with census tract j. If census tracts c and j are nonadjacent, then w cj is equal to zero. Following convention in the spatial econometrics literature, w cc is equal to zero.
5
The complex error structure in this model makes the use of direct maximum likelihood methods infeasible, so we employ the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm, an iterative method of estimating β and ρ.
6 First, we begin with starting values of β and ρ. Using these values, the expected value of the latent variable L bct is calculated, conditional on whether bank b actually was observed making a loan to census tract c in year t. New values of β and ρ are then selected to maximize the likelihood function derived by McMillen (1992) ,
where ω i is the ith eigenvalue of the spatial weight matrix. These values of β and ρ are then used to update the expected value of the latent variable L bct . The EM algorithm continues this process until the change in the values of β and ρ fall below a specified tolerance.
5. For a review of the use of spatial weight matrices in spatial econometrics, see Anselin (1998) or LeSage (1998) .
6. Amemiya (1985) provides an overview of the application of the EM algorithm to discrete choice models.
DATA
The data on small business lending patterns are collected by the Federal Reserve Board to satisfy the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Under this act, independent lending institutions with total assets greater than $250 million, or institutions of any size if they are owned by a holding company with more than $1 billion in total assets, must report annually on the small business loans (defined as loans less than $1 million) that they originate or hold. Thus, the entity surveyed is the bank, in contrast to the Survey of Small Business Finance, which surveys the firm. Both the number and volume of loans are recorded for each reporting bank for the census tract to which the loans were made.
Because of the extremely large number of combinations of borrower census tracts and bank locations that are typical of metropolitan areas, it is not possible to conduct a study that includes all such areas. As a result, this study focuses on lending patterns in nine metropolitan areas located throughout the U.S.
7 These areas were selected at random from the universe of MSAs and CMSAs with populations over 1 million. One such metropolitan area was selected from each of the nine census regions to make the sample geographically diverse. The MSAs selected include the cities of Atlanta, GA; Denver, CO; Indianapolis, IN; Kansas City, MO; Nashville, TN; Providence, RI; Rochester, NY; San Antonio, TX; and Seattle, WA. CRA data were compiled for each of these metropolitan areas.
Each of the CRA-reporting banks in each of the nine areas was checked against the FDIC's Institution Directory to determine if that bank had established at least one office within the area. For those banks with offices in the area, a list of addresses of each bank's branches in that MSA was compiled for each year. These addresses were then geocoded to the longitude and latitude coordinates of the branch address.
For each MSA, the estimations were conducted using a panel data set consisting of census tract observations over the years [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . For each of the withinmarket lenders, the log of the great circle distance (or "distance as the crow flies") between the centroid of each census tract and the closest branch of the bank in that MSA was calculated. Since a major focus is the question of how the importance of distance is changing over time, the log of distance is also interacted with a linear time trend. To allow for the possibility that distance may differ in importance to banks of different sizes, both of these variables (distance and its interaction with time) are interacted with dummy variables for medium (assets between $500 million and $5 billion) and large size banks (assets over $5 billion). Also, to account for bank-specific heterogeneity, bank-specific fixed effects are employed in each of the estimations conducted.
7. Over the years, the academic literature has provided substantial support for the existence of geographically limited markets for both retail deposits and small business loans. The bulk of the evidence has come in the form of price-concentration studies, wherein bank deposit rates or bank loan rates are regressed on measures of local market concentration, calculated under the assumption that MSAs and non-MSA counties approximate local banking markets. See, for example, Berger and Hannan (1989) , Calem and Carlino (1991), and Hannan (1991) . Factors other than distance and bank characteristics-for example, the characteristics of potential borrowers in the census tract-are important in bank lending decisions. A considerable problem encountered in conducting analyses of bank lending at the census tract level is the lack of available data at that level. One source is Dunn and Bradstreet, which compiles data on the number of businesses located in each census tract in the United States over the time period of this study. The log of one plus the number of firms is included as an indication of the strength of demand for loans in each census tract. In addition, to account for additional unobserved heterogeneity across census tracts, census tract fixed effects are employed in some of the reported estimations.
Finally, a potential concern is the case in which the number of offices that a bank operates changes over the period studied. An increase in the number of offices clearly would reduce the distance between bank and census tract for some bankcensus tract combinations. There is little reason to think that this would bias reported results if the assumed functional relationship between distance and the lending decision accurately reflects the true relationship at both shorter and longer distances and if the bank's decision to originate loans to the census tract changes as a result of the change in distance. If these conditions do not hold, however, failure to account for changes in the number of bank offices over time could bias estimates of the role of distance in bank lending decisions. Thus, to roughly account for any influence that changes in the number of bank offices over time may have, the number of bank branches is also included as an explanatory variable. Its inclusion makes little difference to the results of interest. Table 1 indicates that, among CRA-reporting institutions, the share of loans (measured by dollar volume) made by within-market lenders has fallen modestly over the period between 1997 and 2001 and remains quite high throughout the period. The loans of banks that are too small to meet CRA-reporting requirements are not reflected in this table. Since such banks are undoubtedly less likely to lend at long distance, their omission means that these large reported shares accounted for by local lenders are themselves underestimates of the true importance of lending done within the areas that are the focus of this study. Thus, the vast bulk of commercial lending is still done within the geographic areas that are the focus of this study.
RESULTS
It is also possible that the decline in the share of within-market lending reported in Table 1 is itself an overestimate of the trend. A possible reason is a marked trend toward the acquisition of commercial finance companies by commercial banks. Commercial finance companies typically engage in asset-based lending that can be conducted at a much longer distance than the kind of loans more typically originated at commercial banks. The inclusion of such asset-based loans in the portfolios of acquiring banks over time could result in an observed increase in distance (and a reduction in the share of within-market lending) for a reason having nothing to do with a change in the nature of commercial lending. This source of bias may be relevant to all studies that examine trends in distance over times.
As Hannan (2003) notes, the shares of local lending measured in terms of number of loans, rather than the dollar volume of loans, is typically lower and has fallen more precipitously than the shares reported in Table 1 . This is due in large measure to the inclusion in the CRA data of small credit card loans, which have increased substantially in recent years and typically involve large distances between lender and borrower. Attempts to exclude credit card loans from the data yield results closer to those reported for loan volume in Table 1.   8 As reported in Table 2 , summary statistics show a substantial amount of heterogeneity across metropolitan areas (hereafter also referred to as markets). In terms of 8. See Hannan (2003) . the number of census tracts, the size of the metropolitan areas range from Nashville, with 204 tracts, to Seattle, with about three times as many. Even greater disparities are seen in cross-market comparisons of the remaining variables. The distribution of observations across bank size categories also is substantially different across the metropolitan areas examined. While the mean distances between the nearest branch of a bank and the census tract varies substantially, the mean distances observed for actual loans are more uniform across markets and range between two and five miles, with no uniform trend between 1997 and 2001. These distances compare closely with the median distances reported by Peterson and Rajan (2002) but are smaller than median distances of 9-10 miles reported by Wolken and Rohde (2002) . Both of these studies report substantially larger mean distances. Table 3 lists and defines all variables used in the estimations reported in the succeeding tables. Multiple model specifications were estimated for each of the nine metropolitan areas.
9 Table 4 reports results of what may be termed our "base" specifications, which includes bank fixed effects, year binary variables (YEAR1998-YEAR2001), the log of the distance from the centroid of each census tract to the nearest branch of the bank (LnD), terms expressing interaction between lnD and dummy variables indicating that the lending banking organization is mid-sized or large (lnD*Medium and lnD*Large, respectively), a term expressing interaction between lnD and a linear time trend (lnD*T), the log of one plus the number of firms in the census tract (lnFirms), and a variable indicating the number of offices of the bank in the market (NOFF). Table 5 reports the results of estimations that are equivalent, except that the interaction between time and distance (lnD*T) is allowed to differ, depending on the size category of the bank.
The results of other specifications and types of estimation are reported in the appendix. These include estimations that include census tract fixed effects, estimations in which errors are assumed to be spatially uncorrelated (allowing simpler, nonspatial probit estimation), and estimations in which the number of loans to firms in a census tract is employed as the dependent variable. 10 9. To conserve space, coefficients associated with bank-level and census tract-level fixed effects are not reported.
10. Additional estimations that decompose the number of businesses into their one-digit SIC classifications were also performed. The results from these estimations are similar to the results reported here, though the collinearity among the SIC variables was such that many of the SIC coefficients had negative or inconsistent signs. The coefficients on the other variables were largely unaffected. To save space, these specifications are not reported in the paper, though they are available from the authors upon request. Note first from the results presented in Table 4 that the coefficients of lnD are negative and highly significant for all nine metropolitan areas examined. Because of the inclusion of lnD*Medium and lnD*Large in these regressions, the coefficients of lnD reflect the deterring effect of distance in the loan decisions of small banks (those with less than $500 million in deposits). The coefficients of lnD*Medium and lnD*Large are typically positive and significant, with the absolute value of the coefficients of lnD*Large greater than those of lnD*Medium but less than those of lnD. In general, these results suggest that distance is relevant to the lending decision of virtually all banks in metropolitan areas, but much more so for smaller banks than for larger ones. Since current antitrust policy ignores distance considerations in the case of proposed bank mergers in metropolitan areas, these results are clearly relevant to an assessment of that policy, as discussed in more detail below.
Inclusion of lnD*T in these regressions provides information on how this apparent deterring effect of distance has been changing over time in the markets examined. Overall, this deterrent effect of distance in bank lending does not appear to be diminishing over time. Indeed, the results presented in Table 4 suggest that, if anything, the importance of proximity has been growing over time, though this result is not obtained as consistently as those obtained for distance and the interaction of distance with firm size. The coefficients of the interaction between T and LnD are negative and significant at at least the 5% level for six cities (Atlanta, Kansas City, Nashville, Providence, San Antonio, and Seattle) and positive and significant in one case (Indianapolis).
The effects of other bank and census tract characteristics on the lending decision are also of interest. The coefficients of NOFF, introduced to account for any distorting effects caused by changes in the number of offices over time, tend to be positive and significant across the metropolitan areas examined, but not uniformly so. As noted above, the inclusion or exclusion of this variable does not change the results relating to distance in any material way.
The coefficients of the log of one plus the number of firms in the census tract, lnFirms, are uniformly positive and highly significant. This variable is included as a proxy for the demand for commercial loans in the census tract, and these results are clearly consistent with this rationale for its inclusion. Table 5 presents the results of estimations similar to those presented in Table 4 , except that ln(D)*T, the interaction between time and the log of distance, is replaced with three variables: ln(D)*T*Small, ln(D)*T *Medium, and ln(D)*T *Large. This specification allows for separate time-distance trends for each of the three institution size classes. As in the case of Table 4 , distance in all cases has a statistically significant negative impact on the likelihood that a bank will extend credit to firms in a census tract. Furthermore, coefficients of the interactions between distance and bank size variables imply that distance is less of a deterrent for medium-sized banks than for small ones, and still less of a deterrent for large institutions.
While the coefficients of the time-distance trend variables exhibit a pattern similar to the results obtained using a single time-distance trend (Table 4) , they vary across size categories and metropolitan areas. For small banks, the coefficient of the timedistance interaction is positive and significant for Indianapolis, but negative and significant for Kansas City, Nashville, and Seattle. The coefficients of the distancetime interactions for medium-sized and large banks are also more often negative when statistically significant, but again not uniformly so. As in the case of Table 4 , the coefficients of lnFirms reported in Table 5 are positive and highly significant in all cases, while the coefficients of NOFF tend to be positive but are often not statistically significant. For reasons of space, year fixed effects are not reported in this table.
To check the robustness of these results, the appendix reports results of estimations obtained when the specification, estimation procedure, or definition of dependent variable are changed. The first table, Table A1 , reports the results of estimations that are equivalent to those reported in Table 4 , except that census tract fixed effects are added to the bank and year fixed effects already included in Table  4 estimations. This specification controls fully for all time-invariant differences across the many census tracts in each metropolitan area examined. This clearly reduces the explanatory power of the number of firms in the census tract, since only the variation over time in this variable remains. Results regarding the deterring effect of distance to lending for small, medium, and large banks are quite robust with respect to this change. The case for an increase in the deterring effect of distance over time, however, is somewhat weekend with this change. While the coefficients of ln(D)*T are significantly negative in six cases and significantly positive in one case in Table 4, Table A1 reports only two cases of significantly negative coefficients and one case (Indianapolis) of a significantly positive effect. Table A2 reports results obtained using the base specification reported in Table 4 and a simple probit estimation procedure that assumes no spatially correlated errors. As indicated, results regarding the deterring effect of distance to lending for small, medium, and large banks are again quite robust with respect to this change. Also, the case for an increase in the deterring effect of distance over time is as strong as that reported in Table 4 , since the coefficients of ln(D)*T are significantly negative for six metropolitan areas and significantly positive for only one. As in the case of estimations reported in Table 4 , the coefficients of lnFirms are positive and highly significant in every case.
Finally, Table A3 reports results obtained when the number of loans that a bank originates to a census tract replaces as the dependent variable an indicator that it makes at least one. This dependent variable is not used in the estimations reported above for two reasons. First, the rules of CRA reporting can result in a misrepresentation of the actual number of independent origination decisions to firms, and, second, correlation of errors across firms is more likely to be an issue with the use of this dependent variable, since the extent of lending by one bank to a census tract may be negatively correlated with the extent of lending by other banks to the census tract for reasons that are not observable. Nonetheless, as indicated in Table A3 , results obtained using this variable as the dependent variable (and a tobit estimation procedure to account for the fact that this variable has a lower bound of zero) yields results that are quite similar to those reported in Table 4 . As in all estimations, distance has a significant negative impact on the lending decisions of small banks, with the registered impact successively smaller for medium-sized and large banks. Also, the case for an increase in the deterring effect of distance over time is if anything stronger with the use of this variable, since the coefficients of ln(D)*T are significantly negative for seven metropolitan areas and significantly positive only in the case of Indianapolis. As in Table 4 , the coefficients of lnFirms are in every case positive and highly significant.
CONCLUSIONS
There is ample evidence that a number of large banking organizations have substantially broadened the distances at which they are willing to extend some kinds of commercial loans, but there is also evidence that for the vast majority of commercial loans, the distance between borrower and lender has hardly budged. This is most strongly indicated by data from the Survey of Small Business Finance, which indicates almost no change in the median distance between borrower and lender between 1993 and 1998, but a substantial increase in the mean distance.
While the phenomenon of increasing distance for a select minority of loans is of potential relevance to antitrust policy, of perhaps even more importance is the nature of lending that is typically done at shorter distances, where the vast majority of commercial lending (by dollar volume) is still done. The finding that distance has, over time, become less of a deterring factor to lending at this end of the distance spectrum would be a strong indication indeed that things are changing in ways that antitrust policy must accommodate.
However, theories have been advanced that may be interpreted to suggest that, at least at this shorter end of the distance spectrum, distance may not be losing its grip as a deterrent to lending. Indeed, it may even be becoming more important, implying, all else equal, a possible reduction in the distance between borrower and lender for such lending.
In this paper, we employ a new source of data to examine the relationship between lending decisions and distance between lender and borrower for that part of the distance spectrum where, arguably, most of the welfare-enhancing competitive interactions among lenders still occur. We report three basic findings: (1) distance operates as a deterrent to lending, even within areas traditionally defined as local markets, (2) distance is more of a deterrent for small banks than for larger organizations, even within these areas, and (3) for those commercial loans made within areas currently treated by regulators as markets, distance has not been declining in importance. Indeed, a preponderance of the evidence suggests that it is becoming, if anything, more of a factor.
The first two findings are clearly relevant to antitrust policy as applied to the banking industry, since, as currently practiced, it completely ignores the role of distance in the case of proposed mergers between institutions operating in the same urban market. The first of these findings suggests that, even within areas treated by regulatory authorities as markets, the competitive impact of mergers among firms in the market is likely to be less, the more distant they are from each other, while the second finding provides an additional reason why mergers of larger institutions are likely to have a greater competitive impact than the merger of smaller ones. Estimated demand models that account for the role of distance between firms and customers have been used to assess the competitive implications of mergers. These results suggest that, data permitting, it may be fruitful to use these methods as part of antitrust analyses in the banking industry.
The final finding is more interested in assessing the future state of lending competition. Our favored interpretation of it is that the significant innovations in bank lending introduced thus far have "peeled off" only some and probably the more distant loans made previously by local lenders, leaving a hard core of local loans not easily amenable to these new technologies. Theories by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (forthcoming) and Hauswald and Marquez (2002) suggest that greater competition by distant lenders may cause local lenders to focus on the loans for which they have an informational advantage, and this may involve shorter, rather than longer, distances between these lenders and their borrowers. This suggests that the new innovations seen thus far may go only so far in eliminating the local nature of commercial lending. Its complete elimination will probably require some additional innovations.
APPENDIX TABLE A1
Probit Estimation with Spatially Dependent Errors, Including Year, Bank, and Census Tract Fixed Effects 
